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Introduction
Indonesia's foreign investment policy
since 1967 has changed directions several
times in response to fluctuations in econo-
mic fortunes of the country and political
pressure. The advent of the New Order
government in 1966 marked a sharp
reversal in the approach to the economic
problems facing the country. Whereas the
previous government under President
Sukarno adopted an increasingly hostile
attitude towards foreign investment re-
suIting in the takeover of several foreign
enterprises during the early 1960s, the
New Order government put a much
higher priority on solving the serious
economic problems of the country. While
the new government relied on foreign aid
from the Western countries (including
Japan) and multilateral aid agencies to
provide the necessary funds for balance of
payments support and the rehabilitation
of the obsolete infrastructure, it realised
that the development of the country's
vast natural resources and the embryonic
manufacturing sector would have to
depend on foreign direct investment
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[Sadli 1972: 203]. One of the outcomes of
this more pragmatic approach to econo-
mic problems was the promulgation of a
new Foreign Investment Law in early
1967 which provided various favourable
incentives and guarantees to foreign in-
vestors.
The Foreign Investment Law of 1967
introduced a relatively brief period of an
'open-door policy' with regard to foreign
investment which lasted until early 1974.
Urban riots in January 1974 directed
against the perceived 'over-presence' of
Japanese investment in Indonesia (the so-
called 'Malari affair') led to a more
restrictive policy towards foreign invest-
ment. This more restrictive foreign in-
vestment policy, however, turned out to
be in line with a general increase in
regulatory policies and government inter-
vention in the economy which became
more evident after the mid-1970s.
The sharp deterioration in Indonesia's
balance of payments in 1982 and the
protracted slowdown of the Indonesian
economy as a result of the international
recession and the attendant weakening of
the world oil market forced the govern-
ment to introduce a series of policy
reforms, including a reversal of its in-
creasingly restrictive foreign investment
policy. In May 1986 the Indonesian
- 83- 383
government introduced a set of policy
measures (the 'Pakem' or 6 May package)
to increase the international competi-
tiveness of Indonesia's non-oil and gas
exports and improve Indonesia's invest-
ment climate by relaxing several restric-
tive measures to control foreign invest-
ment which had been in effect since the
late 1970s.
Unlike the fundamental turnaround in
foreign investment policy in 1967, how-
ever, shifts in foreign investment policy
after 1967 did not reflect a fundamental
policy change, but rather a pragmatic
response to political pressures (1974) or
adverse economic conditions (1982).
While recent policy measures and
government efforts to promote more
foreign investment mark a partial return
to the 'open-door policy' of the late sixties
and early seventies, it seems unlikely that
the Indonesian government (or any
Indonesian government for that matter)
would ever be prepared to pursue a com-
pletely liberal policy towards foreign
investment. To pursue such a course
would mean a naive disregard of the
potent force of economic nationalism
which no Indonesian government could
afford to do. In hindsight, the 'open-
door policy' of 1967-1973 seems to have
been an 'aberration' from a basic attitude
which can only be attributed to the
desperate situation of the Indonesian
economy after the fall of the Old Order
government. Though present economic
conditions are quite serious, the Indo-
nesian economy in the late 1980s is un-
doubtedly much stronger than it was two
decades ago. With a favourable turn-
around In economIc conditions, the
abiding and widespread national aspi-
ration of 'becoming master in one's own
house' would undoubtedly reassert itself
once again. This would imply a return to
a more restrictive policy with regard to
foreign investment.
In the following pages we will have a
closer look at the shifts in foreign In-
vestment policy since 1967. Since the
largest amount of foreign investment in
the non-oil and gas sectors has taken
place in the manufacturing sector, we will
also see to what extent industrial develop-
ment in Indonesia over the past two
decaded has influenced foreign invest-
ment policy. To this end we will first
discuss Indonesia's industrial policy since
the late 1960s.
Industrial Policy since 1967
a. Official policy
I t is not easy to glean from official
documents the actual thrust of industrial
policy in Indonesia. In fact, the actual
pattern of industrial development since
the late sixties has not always been in
accordance with stated policies. More-
over, stated policies have sometimes also
been rather vague, thus giving rise to
different interpretations, for instance in
regard to the ordering of priorities.
The general direction of Indonesia's
long-term industrial policy is outlined in
the General Guidelines of State Policy
(GBHN), which are set every five years
by the People's Consultative Assembly
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(MPR), the country's highest sovereign
body. The GBHN stipulated that one of
the objectives of long-term development
was to achieve a 'balanced economic
structure' in which a strong progressive
manufacturing sector would be supported
by a strong agricultural sector. To become
the backbone of the Indonesian economy,
the development of the manufacturing
sector would have to be carried out in
successive phases, covering the two dec-
ades of the first four Five Year Develop-
ment Plans (1969/70-1988/89). During
the First Five-Year Development Plan
(Repelita I) priority would be given to
the establishment of manufacturing in-
dustries to support the agricultural sector,
while during Repelita II priority would
be given to resource-processing industries
producing industrial raw materials. Dur-
ing Repelita III industries would be
established which would process the in-
dustrial raw nlaterials into manufactured
goods, and during Repelita IV engi-
neering goods industries would be es-
tablished [Republik Indonesia 1978].
The Repelita I (1969/70-1973/74) doc-
ument spelled out in great detail the
types of industries which would be given
priority, namely:
1. Industries which support the agricul-
tural sector by making agricultural
equipment or by processing agricul-
tural produce;
2. Industries which earn foreign exchange
or save foreign exchange by producing
import-substituting products;
3. Industries which process more domes-
tic than foreign raw materials;
4. Industries which employ more workers
than capital;
5. Industries which through the cumula-
tive effects of their nature promote
regional development [Republik In-
donesia 1969].
Based on the above five guidelines, SIX
specific industries were designated as
priority industries during the Repelita I
period, namely:
1. Fertilizer, cement, and chemical In-
dustries;
2. Textile industry;
3. Paper, pulp, and printing industries;
4. Pharmaceutical industry;
5. Light and handicraft (cottage) indus
tries;
6. Metals, machinery, equipment, and
infrastructure industries [Republik
Indonesia 1969].
The guidelines for industrial develop-
ment during Repelita II (1974/75-1978/
79) were almost the same as those for
Repelita 1. The main difference was that
the order in which the guidelines for
Repelita II was listed had been changed,
apparently reflecting a slight shift in the
order of priorities. Thus Repelita II listed
the following industries as priority in-
dustries:
1. Industries which expand employment
opportunities;
2. Industries which produce basic wage
goods, such as food, clothing, and
building materials for dwellings;
3. Industries which earn or save foreign
exchange through manufactured ex-
ports or make import-substituting
goods. Export-oriented industries
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would include resource processing in-
dustries producing industial raw
materials, as well as industries
producing consumer goods and
intermediate goods. In promoting
resource processing industries which
would utilise domestic resources, de-
velopment would be spurred in those
regions where the resources were
located [Republik Indonesia 1974].
Guidelines for industrial development
set for Repelita III (1979/80-1983/84)
indicated for the first time a clear shift in
favour of an autarchic approach to indus-
trial development. This shift was reflected
in the emphasis given to industries which
would process (domestic) raw materials
into manufactured goods. It was hoped
that in this way most of the country's
needs could be met by locally-made
products, while the export base would
also be widened.
Industrial guidelines for Repelita III
for the first time also emphasized the
equity aspects of development in line with
the general need to achieve a more
equitable distribution of the fruits of
development. To this end Repelita III
put an emphasis on those industries which
would expand employment opportunities
and produce basic needs goods at prices
accessible to the populace. In addition,
emphasis was put on the need for greater
popular involvement in small, medium-
scale, and large-scale industries as well as
the expansion of educational and training
opportunities [Republik Indonesia 1979].
The priority industries emphasized in
Repelita IV (1984/85-1988/89) generally
still included those industries already.
listed in the previous Repelita namely:
1. Industries producing basic needs goods
at prices accessible to the population
at large;
2. Industries producing machinery and
equipment and industries producing
industrial raw materials and ancillary
goods (machinery and basic metal
industries) ;
3. Industries utilizing natural and energy
resources (basic chemical industries),
effectively employing Indonesia's com-
parative advantage;
4. Small and cottage industries, con-
sidered to be important for a more
equitable distribution of business op-
portunities and the expansion of op-
portunities, as well as the establish-
ment of a modern industrial society
[Republik Indonesia 1984].
A novel element in the above guidelines
of Repelita IV was the inclusion of small
and cottage industries as one of the four
priority industries. This belated recogni-
tion of the social and economic impor-
tance of these small and cottage indus-
tries, accounting for 87 percent of the
total work force employed in the manu-
facturing sector according to the 1974/75
Industrial Census [McCawley 1979: 15],
was also reflected in the emphasis laid on
the need to establish a balance between
large and medium industries on the one
hand and small industries on the other.
In fact, to an extent not found in the
previous three Repelita, Repelita IV was
greatly concerned with the need to
establish balances (however defined): a
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balance between agriculture and industry,
and within the manufacturing sector
itself, a balance between large and
medium industries and small industries,
a balance between upstream and down-
stream industries, a balance between
industries for the domestic market and
export industries, and a balance between
capital-intensive and labour-intensive in-
dustries [Republik Indonesia 1984: 17-
18].
The concern with the need to achieve
various balances in industrial develop-
ment suggests the importance of the
engineers' point of view in framing
Indonesia's industrial policy, as these
balances apparently refer to 'material
balances.' In addition, this concern with
balances also underlay an autarchic ap-
proach to industrial development which
was already apparent in Repelita III.
Except for a passing reference to com-
parative advantage in regard to the basic
chemicals industries, no economic or
efficiency considerations seemed to have
played a role in the guidelines for indus-
trial development.
The absence of any evidence of any
meaningful input by economists in deter-
mining Indonesia's industrial policy is
also evident from the fact that while
'balances' in industrial development have
been emphasized, no mention has been
made of the appropriate structure of the
various industries to be set up. Given this
neglect, it is therefore not surprising that
economIC or efficiency considerations
were given so little emphasis, as industrial
economists must have been aware of the
close relationships between the market
structures of the various industries, the
market behaviour of the firms constituting
an industry, and their market perfor-
mance.
b. Actual polieJl
Although the guidelines for industrial
development spelled out in the GBHN
and successive Repelita do provide an
insight into the general direction of indus-
trial development, it neither reflects actual
government priorities nor the policy
measures taken in pursuit of these goals.
Actual industrial policy over time can
better be discerned from the various
directives issued by the Ministry of In-
dustry regulating the operation of various
industries in pursuit of specifically defined
goals and targets, by the Ministry of
Trade regarding the trade regime (par-
ticularly concerning import restrictions,
such as tariff duties and quantitative
import restrictions), and by the Capital
Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM)
regarding the licencing of investment ap-
plications in various fields of activity.
Taking this approach, one can clearly
observe that Indonesia's trade regime and
industrial policies since the early 1970s
have, like so many other developing
countries, fostered an import-substituting
pattern of industrialization. Until 1970
the New Order government had pursued
a relatively liberal trade regime without
much reliance on tariff protection or
quantitative import restrictions, as pro-
tection of domestic industries during this
period was not yet an issue of prime con-
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cern. I t was only after the hyperinflation
of the mid sixties had been brought under
control and the infrastructure had been
rehabilitated that the government was
finally able to turn its attention to the
problem of economic development,
including industrial development.
1. First Phase Import Substitution
The promotion of import-substituting
industries through highly protectionist
policies only started in earnest since the
early 1970s with the implementation of
Repelita 1. While several policy measures
were taken to protect the nascent indus-
tries, the major forms of protection
included tariff duties and import sales
taxes which are collected at the same time
as the tariff duties. The protective effect
of the sales tax derived from the fact that
its rate was often higher than the domestic
sales tax on similar products [Pangestu
and Boediono 1986: 11].
Since the New Order government
assumed power in the mid sixties, three
different tariff classifications have been
used, namely the Geneva Nomenclature
(1965-1973), the Brussels Tariff Nomen-
clature (1973-1980), and the Customs
Cooperation Council Nomenclature. (1980
-present). Although each of these tariff
classifications used different systems of
commodity classification and tariff rates,
the structure of tariff protection provided
by all three classifications showed a
'cascading' pattern. This meant that
consumer goods enjoyed the highest tariff
protection (with rates ranging from 40
to 270 percent under the latest CCCN
classification), followed by intermediate
goods (15 to 30 percent) and raw mate-
rials and capital goods (0 to 10 percent)
[Ariff and Hill 1985: 76]. The effect of
this structure of differential nominal
tariff rates has been that consumer goods
(specifically consumer durables) and
other final goods having gone through
higher stages of fabrication have generally
received higher effective protection (pro-
tection of value added) than intermediate
goods. In turn, these latter goods enjoyed
higher effective protection than industrial
raw materials and capital goods [ibid.:
86]. In view of the initial emphasis on
final consumer goods during the first
phase of import substitution 1967-1975),
this 'made-to-measure' protection seemed
quite appropriate.
The particular structure of tariff pro-
tection in Indonesia (provided by import
duties and import sales taxes) has resulted
in an 'anti-export bias,' with import
competing sectors enjoying effective pro-
tection rates of 60 percent on the average
in 1980, but exports only 32 percent
[ibid.: 85]. As producers' decisions are
affected by effective protection rates, it is
therefore not surprising that businessmen
have tended to invest in import-compet-
ing activities rather than in export
industries.
Despite the fact that the structure of
effective tariff protection contained a
clear 'anti-export bias' in 1980, estimates
of the trend in effective rates of protection
over the decade of the 1970s have in-
dicated that effective protection as a
whole declined over the decade due to the
reduction in nominal tariffs and changes
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In import sales taxes. However, these
tariff reductions affected the export
sector more than the import-competing
sectors, so that by 1980 the import-
competing sectors were still enjoying the
highest levels of nominal and effective
rates· of protection [Pangestu and
Boediono 1986: 27-28J.
2. Second Phase Import Substitution
The persistence of an 'anti-export bias'
in 1980 thus reflected a continued adher-
ence to an import-substituting pattern of
industrialization after the first or 'easy'
phase of import substitution had been
completed by 1975. Instead of shifting to
an export-promoting pattern of industri-
alization, however, policy-makers, buoyed
by vastly increased government revenues
due to the two oil booms of the 1970s,
chose to push the process of industriali-
zation into the second phase of import-
substitution by promoting upstream in-
dustries, including basic industries, inter-
mediate goods industries, and engineering
goods industries. However, in order to
promote this process of the second phase
of import-substituting industrialization,
the government began to rely more and
more on non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and
measures, such as increased local-content
programs, rather than on tariff protection.
In fact, the reliance on tariff protection
continued to decline, as demonstrated by
a major decline in the range and level of
nominal tariff rates introduced by the
government in March 1985 (Table 1).
The above table shows that as a result
of the most recent tariff reductions, more
than 64 percent of the product categories
Table I Distribution of Ad Valorem Import
Tariff Rates, March 1985
Tariff Rates Product Categories
Percentage Number Percentage




100 and over 19 0.4
Total 4,406 100.0
Source: Buku Tarif 1985, as quoted by R.B.
Suhartono [1985: 17].
were enjoying relatively low tariff pro-
tection with ad valorem rates of up to 20
percent. Ifone includes product categories
with tariff protection of up to 40 percent,
the percentage of product categories
covered rises to more than 91 percent.
The most recent tariff reforms included
not only substantial nominal tariff re-
ductions involving more than 60 percent
of the product categories, but also a
substantial reduction in the dispersion of
the nominal tariff rates from a range of 0
up to 225 percent to a range of 0 to 60
percent. In addition, the tariff structure
was also greatly simplified as the number
of tariff rates were reduced from 25 to 11
[Suhartono 1985: 16-19J. This reduction
in the spread and number of tariff rates
can be considered as a significant step
towards a greater uniformity of the pro-
duction incentives affecting the various
industries.
While tariff protection In Indonesia
has slowly declined over the past few
years, non-tariff protection, primarily in
the form of quantitative import restric-
tions, has proliferated in support of Indo-
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nesia's industrial strategy of extending the
process of import substitution to upstream
industries.
The views on how Indonesian industrial
development should further proceed, once
the phase of 'easy' import substitution for
several industries was completed by the
mid 1970s, has been most clearly artic-
ulated by A.R. Soehoed, former Minister
of Industry during the Repelita III
period, who argued that progress in
import-substituting industrialization dur-
ing the decade of Repelita I and II had
resulted "in the widening, rather than in
the deepening, of the industrial structure.
As the scope for further widening the
structure of industry through import
substitution along the past pattern was
getting more limited (by the end of
Repelita II), a stage had been reached
where the further development of manu-
facturing industry would necessitate the
deepening of the industrial structure"
[Soehoed 1981 : 6-7]. Soehoed also argued
that with the completion of the 'easy'
phase of import substitution, the future
growth of the manufacturing sector needed
to be ensured by taking a two-pronged
approach. This approach required that
"first, the optimum use of existing and
newly-established capacities be facili-
tated, and second, rational industrial
development be guided in such a way,
that the growth of manufacturing in-
dustries would be more and more inter-
linked and mutually reinforcing, ver-
tically and horizontally, and industries
would become more deeply-rooted to the
Indonesian economy, and thereby en-
hance the capacity for self-sustained
industrial growth and contribute towards
greater national resilience" [Soehoed
1981: 9-10].
The above quotations have been pre-
sented to indicate the considerations
which were put forward by Indonesia's
policymakers by the late 1970s to lay
down the guidelines for the path of
Indonesia's industrial development. While
one can argue about the validity of the
economic rationale of these views, these
views were and are still held by the
present top decision-makers determining
industrial policy, including Hartarto, the
present Minister of Industry. In fact, in a
recent speech Hartarto put forward six
guidelines for industrial development
during Repelita IV, the first one of which
involved the need "to deepen and sta-
bilize the industrial structure and es-
tablish linkages with the other economic
sectors," while the second one (also in
line with Soehoed's view) emphasized the
need to develop engineering goods in-
dustries, particularly those producing
machinery and electronic equipment
[Hartarto 1985: 18-19].
The above views on 'deepening' the
industrial structure through the genera-
tion of various backward and forward
linkages reflect what in Indonesia has
been called a structuralist approach to
industrialization [CSIS 1982: XVII-
XXIX]. This structuralist approach ap-
parently aims at a high degree of au-
tarchy, as reflected by the argument that
by creating maximum backward and
forward linkages, the "deepening of the
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industrial structure could be achieved,"
and thus 'lessen Indonesia's external
dependence and vulnerability by making
the industrial sector more deeply rooted
to the Indonesian economy' [Soehoed
1981: 8-9]. One could perhaps describe
the above view in a more simple way as
the reflection of a wish to fill up the
various niches in Indonesia's input-output
table as much as possible. In a more
critical vein, the structuralist approach
has also been described as "an inward-
looking, import-substituting approach to
industrialization that pays little, if any
attention, to efficiency considerations."
Hence, this approach does not appear "to
make any comparisons of production
costs with border prices as applied to
various industries with different pro-
duction functions and economies of scale"
[Gray 1982: 41].
While the latter VIew may be a little
unfair to the structuralist approach, the
drive to promote upstream industries in
the late 1970s was buttressed by an array
of various policy measures, the most
important of which included the pro-
tection of the nascent upstream industries,
primarily through import restrictions and
import bans, local content regulations
(deletion programs) and, since late 1982,
through the strict regulation of imports
through licensed importers. In addition,
the nascent upstream industries (basic
and intermediate goods industries) were
also protected by a cumbersome industrial
licensing system, administered by the
Capital Investment Coordinating Board
(BKPM), which strictly regulated, some-
- 91
times even banned, the entry of potential
new entrants into an industry. The drive
to develop new upstream industries,
which would process raw materials into
intermediate and semi-finished products,
and new downstream industries, which
would process primary commodities, was
also being promoted by the provision of
various investment incentives to various
priority projects, the most important of
which involved direct government par-
ticipation [Soehoed 1981: 14].
3. Partial Shift to Export Promotion
However, the sharp deterioration In
Indonesia's balance of payments in 1982
as a result of the severe international
recession and the attendant weakening of
the international oil market required the
government to take several drastic adjust-
ment measures, including a deferral of
several major industrial projects which
were to be undertaken by the government
itself, including an olefin, an alumina,
and an aromatics project [Awanohara
1983 : 51]. The protracted economic
slowdown since 1982, however, has not
only required the government to defer
several ambitious public sector projects
but, in the face of a steady decline in
foreign exchange earnings from oil ex-
ports, to reassess the economic merits of
continuing to pursue an inward-looking,
import-substituting path of industriali-
zation. This reassessment appeared to be
particularly relevant, as one of the major
arguments in support of the decision to
promote upstream industries, namely the
perceived need to 'maintain the growth
momentum of the manufacturing sector'
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(in addition to the need to 'deepen' the
industrial structure) [CSIS 1982: XX],
appeared increasingly implausible in the
face of the continued sluggishness of the
manufacturing sector.
As a consequence of the protracted
slowdown in economic and industrial
growth and the severe pressures on the
balance of payments, the government has
put the promotion of the growth of non-
oil (and natural gas) exports, particularly
manufactured exports, as a top priority.
To achieve this goal, however, a sub-
stantial improvement in the technical
efficiency of Indonesia's largely inefficient
industries is imperative to achieve the
required level of international com-
petitiveness.
Despite a rapid rise In manufactured
exports since oil export earnings started
declining in 1982 (from US$850 million
in 1982/83 to US$4.4 billion in 1986),D
the prospects for a steady and rapid in-
crease in manufactured exports, which
are to form the bulk of non-oil exports,
do not seem too promising at present.
While rising protectionist barriers in the
industrial countries and increasing com-
petition from other developing countries
do pose a real threat to Indonesia's hopes
to become a significant exporter of manu-
factured exports, the general lack of
international competitiveness of its own
manufacturing sector is at present the
biggest obstacle to the realization of these
hopes.
While the Indonesian government since
1983 has taken a series of sensible steps to
1) See, Business News. Jakarta. April29, 1987.
deal with the adverse effects of the steady
weakening of the world oil market, such as
the deferral of several large public sector
projects, the introduction of tax and
financial reforms, the implementation of a
flexible exchange rate policy to avoid an
overvaluation of the exchange rate, and
the simplification of investment proce-
dures and port procedures to reduce over-
regulation and increase efficiency in
customs and port operations, severe
criticism is still being directed at the
highly protectionist trade regime which
has contributed to the establishment of
many inefficient industries.
To promote the emergence of an inter-
nationally competitive manufacturing sec-
tor, critics of current industrial and com-
mercial policy have therefore advocated a
shift from the current import-substitution
regimes to a more export-oriented set of
policies. The arguments of these critics
are primarily based on the fact that the
current trade regime has produced an
'anti-export bias' that provides stronger
incentives to produce for the domestic
market rather than for export markets.
In fact, instead of reducing this 'anti-
export bias,' the government has since
late 1982 increased this 'anti-export bias'
by introducing a series of quantitative
restrictions on the imports of several
intermediate inputs needed by the manu-
facturing industries. While there was an
initial rationale to these quantitative
restrictions in late 1982, namely to reduce
the looming big current account deficit
to more manageable proportions, their
effects have been aggravated by the fact
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that the limited imports of several inter-
mediate inputs could only be conducted
through licensed importers, the number
of which for each product category was
limited to only two or three companies
(sometimes only one), most but not all of
them state-owned trading companies.
Bearing in mind Little's observation
that the major lesson of the successful
experience of the four East Asian NICs
(newly-industrializing countries) in ex-
panding their manufactured exports ra-
pidly lay in their labour-intensive, export-
oriented policies which provided almost
free trade conditions for exporters [Little
1981], it thus appears that until the policy
reforms of 6 May 1986 (the Pakem or 6
May package), it was the very absence
of these almost free trade conditions for
exporters that had been an important
factor in accounting for Indonesia's lack-
lustre performance in expanding manu-
factured exports.
It should be pointed, however, that
Taiwan and Korea in the early 1960s
were able to introduce the required policy
reforms to shift from an import-substitut-
ing to an export-oriented pattern of
industrialization, because at that time
they had not yet gone beyond the first
phase in import substitution (import
substitution of finished consumer goods).
India, on the other hand, had by adopting
Mahalonobis' heavy industry strategy,
proceeded way beyond first-phase (pri-
mary) import substitution to establish
also basic and intermediate goods indus-
tries on a wide scale regardless of their
economic costs. As a result, for India a
switch from an import-substituting to an
export-promoting policy of industrial
development along the lines of the East
Asian NI Cs became very difficult [Lal
1985: 27-28].
Indonesia faces a predicament similar
in India. Although not yet as advanced or
as pervasive as India in extending import
substitution to basic and intermediate
goods industries, a total shift from import-
substituting to outward-oriented, export-
promoting policies in Indonesia is rather
difficult in view of the fact that quite a
few upstream industries (basic and inter-
mediate goods industries) have already
been set up since the late 1970s. Under
these circumstances the provISIOn of
almost free trade conditions for exporters
is very difficult to implement, as such a
policy measure would run counter to the
interests of the infant upstream industries.
To make matters worse, the proliferation
of import monopolies, duopolies, and
oligopolies since late 1982 with large and
lucrative 'rent-seeking' opportunities has
added to the already existing 'anti-export
bias,' which thus far has proved to be
very difficult to reduce, let alone elimi-
nate.
Since May 1986 the Indonesian govern-
ment has tried to reduce the 'anti-export
bias' of its trade regime by providing
almost free trade conditions to manu-
facturing companies which export at least
85 percent of their output. In addition, a
duty drawback system applies to those
companies which export less than 85
percent of their output. These companies
have also been allowed to import those
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intermediate inputs which are subject to
import controls, if domestic suppliers are
unable to provide these inputs at com-
petitive prices.
Further reforms In the trade regime
were introduced on 25 October 1986 and
16 January 1987 to remove some of the
quantitative import restrictions, and to
replace these non-tariff barriers (NTBs)
by an easier-to-administer tariff pro-
tection. While these policy reforms do
constitute an important step towards
reducing the 'anti-export bias,' several
observers have pointed out that these
policy reforms still cover only a relatively
small number of items, with many im-
portant items still being regulated under
the 'approved importers systems' (Tata
Niaga Impor) [Pangestu 1987]. However,
in view of the rather limited scope of the
policy reforms thus far, it still remains to
be seen whether these three policy reforms
can in hindsight be considered important
steps toward the elimination of the 'anti-
export bias' in Indonesia's trade regime
or only promising steps in an aborted
shift from an import-substituting to an
export-promoting policy.
Foreign Investment Policy since 1967
The thrust in Indonesia's industrial
policy has been closely mirrored in its
investment policy, including its policy
towards foreign investment. As a result
of the import-substituting policy of in-
dustrialization, it is not surprising that,
aside from resource-oriented foreign in-
vestment, the bulk of foreign investment
in Indonesia has been of the type oriented
towards the domestic market. This ori-
entation is understandable, as protection
will raise profits in the protected domestic
industry, but will reduce profits of those
foreign firms the exports of which are
being excluded or restricted by protection.
These foreign firms will then resort to
"defensive investment" in the protecting
country to maintain their market in this
country and thereby restore their profits
[Corden 1978: 331-332].
Although no comprehensive data are
available about the market orientation of
all the foreign firms operating in Indo-
nesia's manufacturing sector, survey find-
ings of Japanese-affiliated companies do
seem to confirm that the overwhelming
majority of these investments are indeed
"defensive investments," largely oriented
towards the protected domestic market.
For instance, a survey, conducted by the
Japanese Ministry of Trade and Industry
(MITI) in 1974, disclosed that Japanese-
affiliated companies in Indonesia sold
only 16 percent of their output in the
export market. While some of the ex-
ported goods were labour-intensive pro-
ducts, most of the manufactured exports
of these companies were actually proces-
sed primary resources [Yoshihara 1978:
48-49]. A more recent survey by Kino-
shita revealed that of the 113 Japanese-
affiliated manufacturing companies in
Indonesia, not less than 105 were import-
substitution oriented, while only 3 were
export-oriented, and the remaining 5
were both import-substitution and export-
oriented [Kinoshita 1985: 21]. As Japan
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is the largest investor in Indonesia's man-
ufacturing sector, the domestic market
orientation of these Japanese-affiliated
companies is an important indicator of
the market orientation of foreign-
affiliated companies in Indonesia.
a. More Restrictive Policy
As the first phase of import-substituting
industrialization came to a close by the
late 1970s, and the Indonesian govern-
ment began to promote import substi-
tution in the upstream industries, foreign
investment policy with regard to the
downstream, consumer goods industries
became increasingly restrictive. This is
evident from the rising number of fields
of activity which were closed to foreign
investment, particularly in those fields
where domestic (i.e. national) investors
were considered capable enough to take
over the dominant role hitherto played
by foreign investors. As a result, by the
early 1980s the prevailing view among
many foreign investors in Indonesia was
that 'the party is over,' at least for the
majority who were engaged in the pro-
duction of consumer goods [Astbury
1982: 18]. Instead of more foreign in-
vestment in the downstream, consumer
goods industries, the government intended
to steer more foreign (as well as private
domestic) investment in to the upstream
industries, such as basic metals industries,
which would form the basis for further
industrialization during Repelita IV. In
addition, more foreign (and domestic)
investment was to be promoted in those
downstream operations which would
process Indonesia's abundant natural
resources and agricultural products
[Soehartoyo 1982: 192-193].
b. Less Restrictive Policy
With the move towards a more export-
oriented trade and industrial policy since
the mid 1980s, foreign investment policy
has shifted to attract more export-oriented
foreign investment. As Indonesia has
over the past decade become less at-
tractive to foreign investment as a result
of the increasingly restrictive conditions
introduced since January 1974, several
steps have been taken to simplify and
reduce the regulatory framework of
foreign investment which had been in
effect since the mid-1970s. An important
step in that direction was the policy
package of 6 May 1986 which contained
several provisions to attract more foreign
investment, particularly for export-
oriented activities, including the opening
up of several sectors which hitherto had
been closed to foreign investment.
Although foreign businessmen have
welcomed the latest policy measures with
regard to foreign investment, their actual
response has thus far been lukewarm.
Aside from some restrictive conditions
which still bother foreign investors, for
instance with regard to the dilution
requirement of foreign equity participa-
tion to 49 percent or less within a period
of 10 years after the start of commercial
production, it appears that a substantial
increase in foreign investment will only
be forthcoming with further improve-
ments in the investment climate and a
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steady upturn in the Indonesian economy.
Even then, however, a greater inflow of
foreign investment into export-oriented
industries will only take place with the
elimination of the remaining "anti-export
bias" in the trade regime, and with
further improvements in the country's
infrastructure and an increase in the skill
and productivity levels of the Indonesian
workers. In this respect responses of
foreign investors are hardly different from
those of domestic investors.
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